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Abstract
The distribution of money across households is much more similar to the
distribution of nancial assets than to that of consumption levels, even con-
trolling for life-cycle e¤ects. This is a puzzle for theories which directly link
money demand to consumption, such as cash-in-advance (CIA), money-in-
the-utility function (MIUF) or shopping-time models. This paper shows that
the joint distribution of money and nancial assets can be explained by an
incomplete-market model when frictions are introduced into nancial markets.
Money demand is modeled as a portfolio choice with a xed transaction cost
in nancial markets.
JEL codes: E40, E50.
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1 Introduction
Why do households hold money? Various theories of money demand have proposed
answers to this question by focusing on the transaction role money plays in goods
markets (e.g., shopping-time and cash-in-advance (CIA) models), transaction costs
in nancial markets (Allais, 1947; Baumol, 1952; Tobin, 1956) or simply assuming
a liquidity role of money, as the money-in-the-utility function (MIUF) literature.
These theories are observationally equivalent using aggregate data: they can be
realistically calibrated to match aggregate estimates, such as the interest elasticity
of money demand. In this paper, I argue that household data can be used to assess
the relevance of these di¤erent theories: Household data strongly reject standard
models of money demand, such as CIA, baseline MIUF or shopping-time models,
while theories based on nancial frictions are able to reproduce realistic distributions
of money, consumption and wealth.
In both Italian and US data, the distribution of money (M1) is similar to that of
nancial wealth, and much more unequally distributed than is that of consumption
(as measured by the Gini index, for example). The ranking in the US in 2004 is
as follows: the Gini indices are around 0:3 for consumption, 0:5 for income, 0:8 for
net wealth and 0:8 for money. This result, further detailed below, continues to hold
with di¤erent denitions of money, for various time periods, and after controlling
for life-cycle e¤ects. This distribution of money cannot be understood in stan-
dard macroeconomic models where money demand is introduced via CIA, MIUF or
shopping-time assumptions. In these models, real money balances are proportional
to consumption and the distributions of both money holdings and consumption
should be equally unequal (i.e. have the same Gini coe¢ cient). As is shown below,
this di¢ culty remains even when we consider more general transaction technologies
on the goods market, which may produce scale economies. In addition to its theo-
retical interest, the ability to reproduce the distribution of money is crucial for the
assessment of the real and welfare e¤ects of ination. When money holdings are
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highly dispersed, ination can be expected to have signicant distributional e¤ects.
We here show that a realistic joint distribution of consumption, money and -
nancial assets can be reproduced via a transaction cost in nancial markets only,
without any assumptiona regarding frictions in the goods market. Money demand
is modeled as a portfolio choice between money and a riskless interest-bearing asset.
Money holdings can be freely adjusted, but there is a transaction cost of adjusting
the quantity of nancial assets. This foundation of money demand was introduced
by Allais, Baumol and Tobin (1956), in their inventory approach to monetary the-
ory. Jovanovic (1982) and Romer (1986) provide general-equilibrium extensions,
but without focusing on the properties of the equilibrium distributions. Contrary
to these papers, I assume, as in Heller (1974) and Chatterjee and Corbae (1994),
that households do not need money to make purchases, and do not face a cash-in-
advance constraint. I thus assume that the payment system is well organized, so
that the transaction demand for money is close to zero. This nancial approach to
money demand makes it possible to consider money as a special asset in the theory
of asset prices with transaction costs in nancial markets (see Lo et al. 2004 for
references). In this literature, transaction costs capture the di¤erences in liquidity
between assets (Huang, 2003, for example).
This portfolio choice is introduced into a production economy where innitely-
lived agents face uninsurable income uctuations and borrowing constraints, a frame-
work often described as the "Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari" environment. In this type of
economy, households can choose between two assets with di¤erent returns, but with
di¤erent transaction costs, in order to smooth idiosyncratic income uctuations.
Due to the transaction cost, households participate only infrequently in nancial
markets to rebalance their portfolio, as documented by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
among others. This type of economy does not introduce life-cycle considerations
and is thus well suited for the analysis of heterogeneity within generations. The
model is calibrated to reproduce the idiosyncratic income uctuations faced by US
households. The transaction cost is chosen to match the average quantity of money
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held by households in the US economy.
This model generates a realistic joint distribution of money and nancial assets,
with the transaction cost being the only deviation from the baseline heterogenous-
agents model. This result is robust to various changes in the model parameters, and
to modeling choices. In particular, although the participation cost in the nancial
market a¤ects the average amount of money held, it does not signicantly change
the dispersion of the distribution of money holdings. The main reason for this is
that households hold money to smooth consumption without paying transaction
costs in nancial markets. They only participate in nancial markets to increase
their nancial savings when their money holdings are high, and participate in -
nancial markets to dis-save when their money holdings are low. Between these two
boundaries, which depend on household wealth, money is used as an asset to smooth
consumption. In consequence, although the amount saved in money is on average
much less than that invested in nancial markets, the dispersion of the distributions
of money and assets remain close to each other.
Other Related Literature
Although there is a vast literature on money demand, to my knowledge this
paper is the rst to focus on the properties of the distribution of money across
households in order to assess the relevance of theories of money demand. The
paper belongs rst to the literature on money demand, and more specically to the
Allais-Baumol-Tobin model in general equilibrium. In a recent paper, Alvarez et
al. (2002) introduce both a xed transaction cost and a cash-in-advance constraint
in a general-equilibrium setting. To simplify their analysis of the short-run e¤ect
of money injections, they assume that markets are complete and, in consequence,
that all agents have the same nancial wealth. As my goal is to introduce only
essential departures from the benchmark settings to reproduce the joint distribution
of money and wealth, I only assume a transaction cost in nancial markets and do
not introduce a cash-in-advance constraint. Heller (1974) has proved that the xed
4
transaction cost in nancial markets su¢ ces for money to have a positive value in
equilibrium.
Second, this paper belongs to the literature on money demand in economies with
idiosyncratic shocks and incomplete markets. The initial papers in this literature
considered money as the only available asset for self-insurance against idiosyncratic
shocks (Bewley, 1980 and 1983; Scheinkman and Weiss 1986; Imohoroglu, 1992).
More recent papers have introduced another nancial asset with some additional
frictions to justify positive money demand. Imrohoroglu and Prescott (1991) use a
per-period cost, so that households hold either money or nancial assets, but never
both, and consider the real e¤ects of various monetary arrangements. Erosa and
Ventura (2002) introduce a cash-in-advance constraint and a xed cost of withdraw-
ing money from nancial markets to study the ination tax. Akyol (2004) analyses
an endowment economy where the timing of market openings implies that only high-
income agents hold money. Bai (2005) also introduces transaction costs in nancial
markets, but in the context of an endowment economy to study the real e¤ect of
ination on the real interest rate (the so-called Mundell-Tobin e¤ect) and on welfare.
He does not consider the cross-sectional distributions of money and assets. Algan
and Ragot (2008) introduce money in the utility function to study non-neutralities
induced by binding credit constraints. None of these papers describes or reproduces
the empirical distribution of money. This has, however, been analysed in some of the
more recent papers in the search-theoretic literature (Molico, 2006), which has also
explained the coexistence of money and nancial assets by introducing centralized
nancial markets and decentralized goods markets (Chiu and Molico, 2007). How-
ever, the distribution of money herfe is similar to that of consumption. Finally, Heer
et al. (2007) consider the money-age distribution and conclude that standard mon-
etary models fail to reproduce this distribution, but do not provide an alternative
model. This paper proves that the same puzzle pertains within a given age group,
and that a model with xed participation costs can explain these distributions. To
my knowledge, this paper is the rst to reproduce a realistic joint distribution of
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money and wealth.
This paper is also related to the empirical work which has estimated money de-
mand using household data. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) introduce a xed
adoption cost of the technology to participate in nancial markets, in addition to
a shopping-time constraint. They estimate the adoption cost via various economic
and econometric models using US household data. Attanasio et al. (2002) estimate
a shopping-time model à la McCallum and Goodfriend (1987), using Italian house-
hold data. Finally, Alvarez and Lippi (2007) use Italian household data to estimate
a model where households face a cash-in-advance constraint, a xed transaction
cost and a stochastic cost of withdrawing money. They show that this stochas-
tic component improves the outcome of the model as compared to a deterministic
Baumol-Tobin framework. Although I also use household data, my goal is di¤erent:
I reproduce a realistic joint distribution of money, wealth, and consumption as a
general equilibrium outcome, and show that a simple friction in nancial markets
su¢ ces to generate these results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical facts about
the distribution of money in Italy and the US. Section 3 shows that the usual
assumptiona regarding money demand fails to reproduce these facts. Section 4
describes the xed transaction-cost model, and the parameterization is presented in
section 5. Section 6 presents the results and the distribution of money and assets,
and Section 7 discusses some robustness tests. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 The Distribution of Money
This section presents some empirical facts about the distribution of money and assets
in the Italian and US economies. Although the model below will be calibrated using
US data, I use Italian data to verify that the properties of the distribution of money
are similar across countries. In the following, I use a narrow denition of money, M1,
to emphasisse the distinction between money and other nancial assets. The main
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and robust result of the analysis is that, even with this denition, the distribution
of money appears to be similar to the distribution of assets. The same analysis has
been carried out for various monetary aggregates and the results are quantitatively
similar. As a summary of the following analysis, Fig. 1 depicts the Lorenz curves of
the money, income and net worth1 distributions using the 2004 Survey of Consumer
Finance, and the Lorenz curves of the consumption, income, net worth, and money
distributions using Italian data from the 2004 Survey of HouseholdsIncome and
Wealth. In both cases, I only consider households whose head is aged between 35
and 44 to avoid life-cycle e¤ects. Money is more unequally distributed than income
and net wealth in both countries.
Figure 1: Lorenz Curves of Income (y), Money (m1), Wealth (w) and Consumption (c),
in Italy (left) and the US (right), for households whose head is aged between 35 and 44.
2.1 2004 Italian Data
This section uses the 2004 Italian Survey of Households Income andWealth to exam-
ine the distribution of money. This periodic survey provides data for various deposit
accounts, currency, income and wealth in the Italian population. Each survey is con-
ducted on a sample of about 8,000 households, and provides representative weights.
1As is fairly usual, I use net worth as a summary statistic for all types of assets. The Lorenz
curve of nancial assets is very similar to the Lorenz curve of net wealth.
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A number of recent papers have used this data set to analyse money demand at the
household level (Attanasio, et al. 2002; Alvarez and Lippi 2007, amongst others).
Table 1: Distribution of Money and Wealth, Italy 2004
Gini Index of Cons. Income Net W. Money
Total Population .30 .35 .59 .68
Pop., 35age44 .29 .32 .61 .70
Pop., 35age44, 99%. .27 .31 .57 .63
Table 1 shows the Gini index of the distributions of consumption, income, net
worth and money (in the columns) for three di¤erent types of households (in the
rows). The rst column presents the Gini coe¢ cient for total consumption, and
the rst row shows the results for the whole population. This is fairly low, at .30.
To avoid life-cycle e¤ects the second line focuses on households whose head is aed
between 35 and 44. The Gini coe¢ cient is almost unchanged at .29. The second
column shows the results for the distribution of income. The Gini coe¢ ceinjt is a
little higher than that of consumption at :35, decreasing to :32 for the 35-44 age
group. The third column performs the same exercise for the distribution of net
wealth. This is more dispersed than consumption or income: the Gini coe¢ cient for
net worth is :59, increasing slightly to :61 for the 35-44 age group.
I use Italian data to construct the quantity of money (M1) held by each house-
holds, as the sum of the amount held in currency and in checking accounts. Although
checking accounts are interest-bearing in Italy, the interest rate is low enough for
this aggregation to be relevant: the average interest rate on checking accounts is
below 1%, whereas the average yearly yield of 10 year securities was over 4% in
Italy in 2004. The last column of Table 1 shows the distribution of money. The Gini
coe¢ cient is very high here, at :68, and increases to :70 for the 35-44 age group.
As a robustness check, I consider the distribution of money without including the
1% of the households who hold the nost money. Some households may hold money
to buy very expensive durable goods (houses) in their checking accounts for a few
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days prior to the transaction. If the survey interview occurs during this period, we
observe high levels of money balances that are not relevant2. The Gini coe¢ cient
on money holdings falls from :70 to :63 after this exclusion, but remains high.
The distribution of money is thus similar to that of net wealth, and is very
di¤erent from that of consumption. For space reasons, this section has characterized
the distribution by the Gini coe¢ cient. Howeve, other measures of inequality yield
the same results. This can be seen graphically in Figure 1, which shows the four
Lorenz curves for the population aged between 35 and 44.
Table 2 presents the empirical correlations between money holdings, consumption
levels, income and wealth. Money is positively correlated with consumption, income
and wealth, with a coe¢ cient of between :2 and :3. The correlation between the ratio
of money over total nancial assets and wealth is negative. That is, the share of
money in the nancial portfolio falls with wealth. This property of the money/wealth
distribution had already been noted by Erosa and Ventura (2002) in the US economy.
Table 2: Empirical Correlations, Italy 2004, 35age44
Money & Income .21
Money & Consumption .27
Money & Net Wealth .30
(Money/Fin. W.) & Net .W. -0.13
2.2 US Data
US data do not allow us to carry out the same detailed analysis: Income, money
and nancial wealth come from by the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), and the
distribution of consumption can be found in the survey of Consumer Expenditures
2I carry out this exercise even though it is problematic to justify the exclusion of this 1% of
households. If households keep money to buy a house over a period of one week, and buy a new
house as often as every ve years, the probability that they will be observed with this money the
day of the interview is only (1=52)  (1=5) = 0:4%:
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(CE). Hence, we cannot calculate the correlation between consumption and money.
I use a conservative denition of money, which is the amount held in checking
accounts. This is the only fraction of M1 which is available in the data. I also
provide statistics for the amount held in all transaction accounts, which correspond
to the M2 aggregate.3
The distribution of money in the SCF4 2004 is investigated in Table 3. The
Gini index of the distribution of money held in checking accounts is given in the
rst row. This is very high at .81. As before, to exclude life cycle e¤ects, the
second row focuses on households whose head is aged between 35 and 45. The
Gini coe¢ cient increases to .83 here. Finally the third row excludes the 1% money-
richest households: the Gini coe¢ cient falls, but is still high at .75. The second
column performs the same analysis for money held in all transaction accounts, such
as checking, savings and money market accounts. The Gini coe¢ cient here is of
the same order of magnitude, and decreases from .85 to .79. excluding the excludes
the 1% money-richest households.
The results for the distribution of net wealth are given in column 3. The values
of the Gini index are very similar between specications. Last, column 4 shows the
results for the distribution of income. The Gini index is lower than that for the
distribution of money for all denitions of money and for all sets of households. As
a result, the distribution of money is much closer to the distribution of net wealth
than to the distribution of income.
The correlation between money (checking account), income and other assets is
presented in Table 4. Money is positively correlated with both income and net
wealth: richer households hold more money on average. The last line of Table 4
3Note that this measure of money does not include currency, which is not available for US
households.
4The same exercise can be carried out for a number of years of the SCF. The results are
quantitatively similar.
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Table 3: Distribution of Money and Wealth
Gini Index of Check. Acc Trans. Acc Net W. Income
Total Population .81 .85 .81 .54
Pop., 35age44 .83 .85 .80 .47
Pop., 35age44, 99%. .75 .79 .73 .41
shows the correlation between the ratio of money in nancial wealth and total net
wealth. This correlation is negative. As in the Italian data, richer households hold
more money but as a smaller fraction of their nancial wealth.
Table 4: Empirical Correlations
US, 2004, 35age44
Money & Income .12
Money & Net Wealth .17
(Money/Fin. W.) & Net Wealth -0.08
Table 5 below presents some additional properties of the joint distribution of
money and assets in the US economy, which will be used to illustrate the models
outcome. The table represents the fraction of total wealth and total money held
by the richest 1% of the population (line 1), the richest 10% (line 2), the richest
20% (line 3) and the poorest 40% (line 4). First, the richest households hold a
signicant fraction of money, whereas te 40% poorest households hold a much lower
fraction. Second, we can check that the proportion of money in total wealth is higher
for the poorest households than for the richest households. Poor households hold
relatively more money than nancial assets, but they hold a smaller fraction of the
total quantity of money.
Finally, the distribution of consumption can be obtained from the survey of
Consumer Expenditures (CE). Krueger and Perri (2002) note that the distribution
of consumption is much less unequally distributed than the distribution of income.
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Table 5: Asset Holding Distribution
US Data, 35age44
Fract. of Wealth Fract. of Checking
Wealth 99-100 32.7% 10.9%
Wealth 90-100 70.0% 60.8%
Wealth 80-100 82.4% 72.6%
Wealth 0-40 1.03% 5.4%
The consumption Gini coe¢ cient is around 0.27 and changes only little over time.
I calculate the same Gini coe¢ cient for total consumption using the NBER extract
of the Consumer Expenditures in 2002, which is the latest year available. I nd
a Gini coe¢ cient of :28. There is substantial empirical debate about the quality
of the data and the estimated changes in consumption inequality (Attanasio et al.
2004, for example). The consensus view is that consumption levels are less unequally
distributed than income. As a result, the distribution of money is much closer to
the distribution of total wealth than to the distribution of consumption.
To summarize these US and Italian ndings: 1) inequality in money holdings is
more similar to inequality in net wealth and very di¤erent from inequality in con-
sumption; 2) money is positively correlated with wealth, income and consumption
levels; and 3) the ratio of money over nancial assets falls with wealth.
3 Some Di¢ culties in Linking Money and Con-
sumption
Simple models of money demand. Simple models of money demand cannot re-
produce the shape of the distribution of money, when they link money demand to
consumption. They assume that the real money holdings of a household i, mi, are
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simply proportional to consumption, ci
mi = Aci
where A is a constant, the same for all households, which may depend on the nominal
interest rate, real wages and preference parameters. This form is used for instance
in Cooley and Hansen (1989) to assess the welfare cost of ination. It also results
in all models with money-in-the utility function (MIUF) where the utility function
is homothetic in money and consumption in the sense of Chari et al. (1996), which
is the benchmark case in this literature. It is also obtained in a simple specication
of the shopping-time model (McCallum and Goodfriend 1987).
In this case, the distributions of money and consumption are homothetic, and
their Gini indexes are equal. The di¤erence in the data cannot therefore be ex-
plained.
Economies of scale in the transaction technology. Some authors have noted that the
share of money holdings in total wealth falls with total wealth and have concluded
that the transaction technology exhibits scale economies: Richer households, even if
they consume more, need less money because they buy more goods via credit. Dotsey
and Ireland (1996) provide a microfoundation of this transaction technology, which
uses the exibility provided by the denition of cash and credit goods of Stokey and
Lucas (1987). Erosa and Ventura (2002) use this formulation of a heterogenous-
agents setting. This implies that the quantity of money and the consumption level
of household i satisfy the following relationship:
mi
ci
= A
 
ci
 
with  > 0 (1)
However, this specication is not able to reproduce a realistic distribution of
money. With moderate returns (a low value of ), the distribution of money is more
equally distributed than the distribution of consumption, because the households
with higher consumption levels hold fewer real balances. A more dispersed distri-
bution of money can only be obtained with a very high increasing return in the
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transaction technology. In this case, households who consume the most hold al-
most no money, whereas households who consume little hold higher levels of money
balances. However, one counterfactual implication of this assumption is that con-
sumption and money will be negatively correlated, as higher consumption implies
lower money holdings and vice versa.
To illustrate, I consider the equilibrium distribution of consumption of Italian
households aged between 35 and 44. I generate ctitious money distributions with
various transaction technologies, using the general form of the transaction technology
(1) for various values of . I nally analyze the distributional properties of the joint
distribution of money and consumption. The results are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Properties of the Distribution of Money for Di¤erent Transaction Tech-
nologies
Values of  Data 0 0:5 1 2 3:7  1:7
Gini of consumption .29 .29 .29 .29 .29 .29 :29
Gini of Money :70 .29 14 0 0:30 :70 :70
Corr. Money Consumpt. :27 1 :97 0  0:63  0:36 0:69
Table 6 presents the value of the Gini coe¢ cient and the correlation between
money and consumption for various values of : For  less than 1, the distribution
of money is more concentrated than the distribution of consumption. To obtain a
wider dispersion of money, the returns on the transaction technology must be higher
than 1, but the correlation between money and consumption then becomes negative,
which is counterfactual.
The same type of experiment can be carriet out with the US Data. Using the
distribution of money, I generate a ctitious distribution of consumption using (1).
I determine the value of  for which the distribution of consumption is realistic in
terms of the Gini coe¢ cient. One again, we need a value of  of over 3 to obtain a
Gini coe¢ cient under :47, which is the Gini coe¢ cient on income.
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Finally, note that the microfoundation of money demand with scale economies in
Dotsey and Ireland (1996) requires increasing returns to scale to obtain the correct
sign on the interest elasticity of money demand. Erosa and Ventura (2002), who do
not explicitly reproduce the distribution of money, use a value of  of over 3. Algan
and Ragot (2008), who use a MIUF framework, assume that  = 0.
The following model proves than we can obtain a realistic distribution of money
by focusing on transaction technologies in the nancial market and not in the goods
markets. The correlation between money and consumption will appear as an out-
come, rather than as a specic utility function imposed on the households.
4 The Model
The economy is populated by a unit mass of households, a representative rm and
the Government. There is a consumption-investment good and there are two assets:
money and a riskless asset issued by rms. The Government nances a public good
vai the ination tax and distortionary taxes on labor and capital.
Time is discrete and t = 0; 1; :: denotes the period. There is no aggregate un-
certainty, but households face idiosyncratic productivity shocks. These shocks are
not insurable, and households can partially self-insure by holding money or riskless
assets. The crucial assumption is that households must pay a xed cost  in terms
of the nal good5 to enter the nancial market in order to adjust their nancial
position, and pay no cost to adjust their monetary holdings.
4.1 Households
There is a continuum of length 1 of innitely-lived households who enjoy utility
from consumption c and disutility from hours worked n. For simplicity only, I
follow Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988) and Domeij and Heathcote (2004)
5The results do not signicantly change if we assume that this cost is paid in labor, and thus
a¤ects labor supply.
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in assuming the following functional form for the period utility function (see also
Heathcote 2005 for a discussion of the properties of this functional form):
u (c; n) =
1
1  
24 c   n1+ 1"
1 + 1="
!1 
  1
35
In this specication, " is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,  scales average labor
supply, and  is the risk-aversion coe¢ cient. In each period, a household i can
be in one of three states according its labor market status. Its productivity eit is
then either e1; e2 or e3. For instance, a household whose productivity is e1 and
which works nt hours earns labor income of e1ntwt, where wt is the after-tax wage
by e¢ ciency unit. Labor productivity eit follows a three-state rst order Markov
chain with transition matrix T . Nt = [N1t ; N
2
t ; N
3
t ]
0 is the distribution vector of
households according to their state on the labor market in period t = 0; 1:::. The
distribution in period t is N0T t. Given standard conditions, which will be fullled
here, the transition Matrix T has an unique ergodic set N = fN1 ; N2 ; N3g such
that NT = N. To simplify the dynamics, I assume that the economy starts with
the distribution N of households.
The variables ait and m
i
t denote respectively the real quantity of nancial assets
and money held at the end of period t  1, and rt is the after-tax real interest rate
on the riskless asset. Pt denotes the money price of one unit of the investment-
consumption good, and t = Pt=Pt 1 is the gross ination rate between periods
t  1 and t. The real revenue at the beginning of period t of a household holding ait
and mit is thus
mit
t
+ (1 + rt) at.
Households pay proportional taxes on capital and labor income:  cap is the
tax rate on capital and  lab is the tax rate on labor. The variables ~wt and ~rt are
respectively the real wage and the real interest rate before taxes:
wt =
 
1   labt

~wt
rt = (1   capt ) ~rt
In period t, each household can choose to participate or not in the nancial market.
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If it participates, it pays a cost  and can freely use its total monetary and nancial
resources m
i
t
t
+ (1 + rt) at to consume the amount cit; and to save a quantity a
i
t+1 in
nancial assets and a quantitymit+1 in money. If the household does not participate,
it can only use its monetary revenue mit=t to consume c
i
t and to keep a fraction
mit+1 in money. It is assumed that its nancial wealth is reinvested in nancial
assets6: ait+1 = (1 + rt) a
i
t. This transaction choice is summarized by the dummy
variable I it , which equals 1 when the household participates and 0 otherwise.
No private households can issue money mit  0, and households face a simple
borrowing limit when participating in nancial markets: ait  0; for t = 0; 1:: and
i 2 [0; 1].
The program of households i can be summarized as follows:
max
fmit+1;ait+1;cit;nit;Iitgt=0;1::
E0
1X
t=0
tu
 
cit; n
i
t

subject to
cit +m
i
t+1 + I
i
t
 
ait+1   (1 + rt) ait + 

= eitwtn
i
t +
mit
t 
1  I it
  
ait+1   (1 + rt) ait

= 0
cit; n
i
t;m
i
t+1; a
i
t+1  0; I it 2 f0; 1g
ai0;m
0
i given
Recursive Formulation
The program of the households can be written in a recursive way as follows (See
Baim 2005, for a proof of the existence of Bellman equations in a similar economy).
Dene V part (a
i
t;m
i
t; e
i
t) as the maximum utility that a household with productivity e
i
t
can reach at period t if it participates in nancial markets at period t and if it holds
an amount mit and a
i
t of monetary and nancial wealth respectively; V
ex
t (a
i
t;m
i
t; e
i
t)
is the analogous utility if the household does not participate.
6This is the standard assumption made by Romer (1986) for instance. The quantitative results
do not change if interest is paid in money.
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The Bellman value V part (a
i
t;m
i
t; e
i
t) satises
V part
 
mit; a
i
t; e
i
t

= max
ait+1;m
i
t+1;n
i
t;c
i
t
u
 
cit; n
i
t

+ EtmaxfV part+1
 
mit+1; a
i
t+1; e
i
t+1

; V ext+1
 
mit+1; a
i
t+1; e
i
t+1
g
mit+1 + a
i
t+1 + c
i
t = wte
i
tn
i
t +
mit
t
  + (1 + rt) ait
cit; n
i
t; a
i
t+1;m
i
t+1  0
The value V ext (a
i
t;m
i
t; e
i
t) satises
V ext
 
mit; a
i
t; e
i
t

= max
mit+1;n
i
t;c
i
t

u
 
cit; n
i
t

+ EmaxfV part+1
 
mit+1; a
i
t+1; e
i
t+1

; V ext+1
 
mit+1; a
i
t+1; e
i
t+1
g	
mit+1 + c
i
t = wte
t
in
i
t +
mit
t
ait+1 = a
i
t (1 + rt)
cit; n
i
t;m
i
t+1  0
Note rst that the denition of the Bellman equations di¤ers according to the bud-
get constraints of the household: either the household faces one budget constraint,
or the consumption choice is made facing both monetary and nancial budget con-
straints. Second the household anticipates that its current portfolio choice may
a¤ect it participation choice tomorrow.
Finally, the maximum utility that a household with productivity eit and assets
mit and a
i
t can reach is
Vt
 
mit; a
i
t; e
i
t

= maxfV part
 
mit; a
i
t; e
i
t

; V ext
 
mit; a
i
t; e
i
t
g
According to this last maximization, the household either chooses to participate, in
which case I it = 1; or not, I
i
t = 0.
The solution of the households problem produces a set of optimal decision rules
dened over the productivity set E = fe1; e2; e3g and the set of assets:
ct(:; :; :) : R+  R+  E  ! R+
at+1(:; :; :) : R+  R+  E  ! R+
mt+1(:; :; :) : R+  R+  E  ! R+
nt(:; :; :) : R+  R+  E  ! [0; 1]
It(:; :; :) : R+  R+  E  ! f0; 1g
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
t = 0; 1; :::
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4.2 Firms
The consumption-investment good is produced by a representative rm in a com-
petitive market. Capital depreciates at a rate of  and is installed one period before
production. We denote by Kt and Lt aggregate capital and aggregate e¤ective labor
used in production in period t . Output Yt is given by
Y = F (Kt; Lt) = K

t L
1 
t , 0 <  < 1
E¤ective labor supply is:
Lt = e
1L1t + e
2L2t + e
3L3t
where L1t , L
2
t and L
3
t is the aggregate labor supply of workers of productivity 1; 2
and 3 respectively. Prot maximization yields the following relationships
~wt = F
0
L (Kt; Lt) (2)
~rt +  = F
0
K (Kt; Lt) (3)
where ~wt and ~rt are before-tax real wages per e¢ cient unit and the real interest rate.
4.3 Monetary Policy
At each period t, monetary authorities create an amount of new money t. Let Mt
be the total amount of nominal money in circulation at the end of period t. The
law of motion of the nominal quantity of money is thus
Mt =Mt 1 +t (4)
The real value of the ination tax is thus t=Pt.
I focus below on stationary equilibria where monetary authorities create a quan-
tity of money proportional to the total nominal quantity of money of the previous
period, with a coe¢ cient of . In this case t = Mt 1 and the revenue from the
ination tax is Mt 1=Pt.
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4.4 Government
The Government nances a public good, which costs Gt units of goods in period
t. It receives the ination tax t=Pt and the proportional taxes on capital and
labor income, with coe¢ cients  capt and 
lab
t respectively. It is assumed that the
Government does not issue any debt. Its budget constraint is
Gt = 
cap
t ~rtKt + 
lab
t
 
N1t L
1
t e
1
t +N
2
t L
2
t e
2
t +N
3
t L
3
t e
3
t

~wt +
t
Pt
(5)
where N1t , N
2
t and N
3
t are the number of type 1; 2 and 3 households respectively.
4.5 Market Clearing
Denote t : R+  R+  E  ! [0; 1] as the joint distribution of households over
nancial assets, money holdings and productivity in period t. Money and capital
market equilibria state that money is held by households at the end of each period,
and that nancial savings are lent to the representative rm. These can be written
as, for t  0 :
Mt =
Z
R+R+E
Ptmt+1 (a;m; e) dt (a;m; e) (6)
Kt+1 =
Z
R+R+E
at+1 (a;m; e) dt (a;m; e) (7)
The goods-market equilibrium requires that the amount produced is consumed by
the State, invested in the rm, consumed by the households, but also destroyed in
the transaction cost. This can be written as
Gt +Kt+1 +
Z
R+R+E
ct (a;m; e) dt (a;m; e)
+ 
Z
R+R+E
It (a;m; e) dt (a;m; e) = F (Kt; Lt) + (1  )Kt (8)
4.6 Equilibrium
For a given path of Government spending fGcapt gt=0::1 and money creation ftgt=0::1,
an equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of decision rules ct(:; :; :), at(:; :; :);mt(:; :; :); nt (:; :; :)
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It(:; :; :) dened over R+  R+  fe1; e2; e3g for t = 0::1, sequences of prices
fPtgt=0::1, f~!gt=0::1 and f~rgt=0::1, and sequences of taxes f labt gt=0::1 and f capgt=0::1
such that:
1. The functions ct(:; :; :), at(:; :; :);mt(:; :; :); nt (:; :; :) It(:; :; :) solve the house-
holds problem for a sequence of prices fPtgt=0::1, f~!gt=0::1 and f~rgt=0::1, and
taxes f labt gt=0::1 and f capgt=0::1.
2. The joint distribution t over productivity and wealth evolves according to
the decision rules and the transition matrix T .
3. Factor prices are competitively determined by rm optimal behavior (2)-(3).
4. The quantity of money in circulation follows the law of motion (4).
5. Markets clear: equations (6)-(8).
6. Tax rates f labt gt=0::1 and f capt gt=0::1 are such that the government budget
(5) is balanced.
A stationary equilibrium is an equilibrium where the nominal money growth
rate, the values G;  lab;  cap, r, w, the gross ination rate  = Pt
Pt 1
, the joint dis-
tribution  and the decision functions c(:; :; :), a(:; :; :);m(:; :; :); n (:; :; :) I(:; :; :) are
time-invariant. In such an equilibrium, the aggregate real variables are constant
whereas the nominal variables all grow at the same rate.
5 Parameterization
The model period is one quarter. Table 7 summarizes the parameter values at a
quarterly frequency in the stationary benchmark equilibirum
Table 7: Parameter Values
    "  cap  lab   
0:36 0:99 117 1 0:3 0:397 0:296 0:015 0:007 0:13
Preference and scal parameters
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The preference and technology parameters have been set to standard values. The
capital share is xed at  = 0:36 (Cooley and Prescott, 1995) and the depreciation
rate is  = 0:015, such that the annual depreciation rate is 6% (Stokey and Rebelo,
1995). The discount factor  is set to 0:99, to obtain a realistic capital-output ratio of
around 3. The risk-aversion parameter, , is set to 1. The Frisch Elasticity of labor
supply " is estimated to be between 0:1 and 1. I follow Heathcote (2005) and use
a conservative value of 0:3. Given this value,  is set such that aggregate e¤ective
labor supply is close to 0:33. The scal parameters are calibrated to match the
actual tax distortions in the US economy. Following Domeij and Heathcote (2004),
the average tax rate on capital income  cap is 39.7 percent, whereas the average tax
rate on labor income  lab is 26.9 percent. The implied government consumption to
annual output ratio is 0:24, which is a little higher than, but not too dissimilar to,
the U.S. average of 0:19 over the 1990-1996 period.
The household productivity process
Di¤erent models of the income process are now used in the literature. Our
modeling strategy is to use a simple process which yields realistic distributions for
consumption, income and wealth. I consequentlyh use that in Domeij and Heathcote
(2004), with endogenous labor used at a quarterly frequency. They estimate a three-
state Markov process, which reproduces the process for logged labor earnings using
PSID data. The Markov chain is estimated under two constraints: (i) The rst-order
autocorrelation in annual labor income is 0:9; and (ii) The standard deviation of the
residual in the wage equation is 0:224. These values are consistent with estimations
found in the literature (Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron, 2007; Floden and Lindé
2001, amongst others).
The transition matrix is
T =
26664
0:974 0:026 0
0:0013 0:9974 0:0013
0 0:026 0:974
37775
The three productivity levels are e1 = 4:74, e2 = 0:848, e3 = 0:17. The long-run
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distribution of productivity across the three states is N = [0:045 0:91 0:045]0.
This parametrization yields a realistic distribution of both wealth and consumption,
which is very useful for the issue that we address.
Monetary Parameters
The remaining parameters concern monetary policy and the transaction cost.
First, I consider the average US annual ination rate in 2004, 2:8 percent. Conse-
quently, the quarterly ination rate is  = 0:007. I calibrate the transaction cost
 = 0:13 to reproduce the ratio of money over income of households between 35
and 44 years old. Money is dened as above as the amount in checking accounts
in SCF 2004. The ratio of money over income is 8%. I nd a value of 0:19 for ,
which corresponds to 3% of householdsaverage annual income. Scaling by average
income per capita in the US of $43000, we nd an annual transaction cost to nan-
cial markets for the riskless asset of around $1450. To my knowledge, there is no
consensus in the empirical literature regarding the level of such costs. The empirical
strategy of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Paiella (2001) only provides the
median cost or the lower bound of the participation cost. Some insights can be
obtained from the literature which estimates the cost of participating in the risky-
asset market. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimates this participation cost to be as
high as 1100 dollars in order to understand the transaction decisions of 95% of non-
participants, whereas a cost of 260 dollars su¢ ces to explain the choices of 75% of
non-participants. In consequence, although our cost is towards the top-end of these
estimates, it is not inconsistent with current empirical results. I show below the
results of the model at a monthly frequency. This estimation of the transaction cost
is robust to changes in the denition of the period.
6 Results
This section rst presents the household policy rules and then the properties of the
distribution of consumption, income, money and total wealth.
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6.1 Participation Decisions
The economic behavior of households is best described by the participation decision
in nancial markets. Fig. 8 presents the household decision rule of according to
their productivity. The x-axis measures the quantity of nancial assets held at the
Table 8: Participation Decisions
Type 1 Households Type 2 Households Type 3 Households
beginning of the period, and the y-axis shows the quantity of money held at the
beginning of the period. Each point is a begining-of-period portfolio. For each
household type, the dark area represents the portfolio for which households choose
not to participate in nancial markets. The lighter area represents portfolios for
which households choose to participate in nancial markets. Households holding a
high quantity of money and a small quantity of nancial assets (in the South-West
corner) and households holding a small quantity of money and high quantity of assets
(in the North-East corner) both participate in nancial markets; the households who
are inbetween do not participate. Households with a large amount of money and few
assets (NE) participate to save in nancial assets and dis-save money. Households
with little money and many assets participate to dis-save in nancial assets and save
in money. It can be seen that the lower is productivity the bigger ius the area where
households dis-save, and the smaller is the area where households save. Households
thus hold both money and nancial assets in equilibrium, although the (marginal)
return on money is lower than that on nancial assets.
24
6.2 The Distribution of Money and Financial Assets
The distribution of consumption, income, nancial wealth and money in the bench-
mark economy is summarized in Table 9, which presents the associated Gini coe¢ -
cients.
Table 9: Gini Indexes
Consumption Income Money Wealth
US Data (age 35-44) :28 :47 :83 :80
Model :32 :37 :85 :81
First note that the ranking of the Gini coe¢ cients is the same as that in the
data, and that the model performs quantitatively well in reproducing the inequality
in the distribution of consumption, income, money and wealth. The Gini of the total
wealth distribution is 0:81. Domeij and Heathcote (2004) nd a Gini coe¢ cient of
0:78 in a similar economy with only nancial assets. The introduction of money
does not thus signicantly modify the shape of the distribution of assets. The Gini
coe¢ cient for money is 0:85, which is very similar to that actually observed in the US
economy. The Gini coe¢ cient for consumption is a little higher than its empirical
counterpart, whereas the Gini coe¢ cient for income is greater than that found in
the data.
Table 10 below investigates the distributional properties of the model. As in
Table 5 above, the table shows the fraction of wealth and money held by various
subpopulations, ranked by their wealth. The right-hand side of the table presents the
values produced by the model. For ease of comparison, the left-hand side reproduces
the empirical counterparts in the US in 2004. The model performs relatively well in
reproducing the wealth and money holdings of the poorest households. However, it
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does not reproduce a realistic distribution of wealth for the richest 1% of households.
This di¢ culty is known in this class of models. One solution is to introduce life-cyle
e¤ects and bequest motives, as in Di Nardi (2005) for instance.
Table 10: The Distribution of Asset Holdings
US Data, 35age44 Model
Fract. of Wealth Fract. of Checking Fract. of Wealth Fract. of Money
Wealth 99-100 32.7% 10.9% 14.0% 0.3%
Wealth 90-100 70.0% 60.8% 68.7% 43.2%
Wealth 80-100 82.4% 72.6% 84.7% 79.4%
Wealth 0-40 1.0% 5.4% 1.5% 2.1%
Table 11 presents the correlation between money, income and nancial wealth
generated by the model. The left-hand side shows values in US data for the relevant
age group, and the right-hand side shows the model results. All of the model correla-
tions have the right signs. Further, the correlations between money & consumption
and money & wealth are higher than those in the data. There are therefore other
sources of heterogeneity in money holdings which are not captured by the model.
Finally, the model is able to reproduce the average negative correlation between
wealth and the ratio of money to total wealth.
7 Robustness Checks
The model thus yields a realistic joint distribution of money and nancial assets.
Three robustness checks are considered in this section. First, the model is parameter-
ized with di¤erent values for transaction costs, to produce changes in the distribution
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Table 11: Empirical Correlations,
US Data Model
Money & Income .12 .40
Money & Consumption - .45
Money & Wealth .17 .39
(Money/ Wealth) & Wealth -0.08 -0.07
of money and wealth. Second, the model is parameterized at a monthly frequency.
Third, we see whether the results are robuse to an alternative labor-income process.
7.1 The E¤ect of Transaction Costs
To assess the e¤ect of transaction costs on the inequality in the money distribution,
Table 12 presents the change in relative money holdings as the cost  varies. To
simplify the exposition, this cost is presented as a percentage of the benchmark
value.
The rst line shows the change in nancial wealth, and the second represents
the change in money holdings. All gures are expressed as a percentage of the value
of the nancial wealth held in the benchmark case. For example, in the benchmark
case, households hold money equal to 2% of their amount held in nancial wealth.
The third and fourth lines present the Gini coe¢ cients for money and nancial
wealth respectively.
Table 12: Share of Money Holdings
 0 50 100 200 1
Fin. Wealth 278 117 100 80 0
Money 0 1:26 2:02 2:67 12:5
Gini Money   0:81 0:82 0:84 0:94
Gini Fin. W. 0:63 0:79 0:77 0:79  
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When  = 0, there is no transaction cost in entering nancial markets, and as
a result money is a dominated asset which is not held in equilibrium. This is the
benchmark Hugget (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) models. When  = 1, the trans-
action cost of entering the nancial market is too high and households only hold
money. This corresponds to the Bewley (1983), Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) and
Imrohoroglu (1992) models. For values of  between these two extremes, house-
holds hold both money and nancial assets in equilibrium. The quantity of money
(nancial assets) held decreases (increases) with the transaction cost. In all cases,
the Gini coe¢ cient for money remains high, and actually rises with the transaction
cost. The greater the quantity of money in the economy, the more unequally it is
distributed.
7.2 A Monthly Specication
As a robustness check, the model is re-calibrated at a monthly frequency. The
discount factor, the nancial market transaction cost, and the preference for leisure
have been re-calibrated to match roughly the same capital-output ratio, the same
money-output ratio and the same labor supply. The modied parameters are listed
below.
  
210 0.9968 0.75
The labor process has been modied accordingly. The new transition matrix T  is
such that T = (T )3 :
The results are very similar to those from the quarterly specication. For instance
the Gini coe¢ cient for money is 0:82 and that for wealth is 0:82: The transaction
cost  is 2:3% of annual average income, whereas it was 3% in the quarterly cali-
bration. The results of the model are therefore roughly invariant to the denition
of the period. I use the quarterly specication to increase the converge speed of the
algorithm.
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7.3 An Alternative Income Process
Before using this model to assess the e¤ect of ination, I check that its ability to
reproduce the distribution of money is not due to the particular values of the para-
meters retained in the calibration exercise. I here follow the calibration described in
Diaz, Pijoan-Mas and Rios-Rull (2003) which is a simplied version of Castaneda,
Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003). I use this calibration at a quarterly frequency.
Here, labor supply is exogenous and households face the earning process
fe1; e2; e3g =
n
1:000; 5:290; 46:550
o
T =
26664
0:998 0:002 0
0:0022 0:9949 0:0029
0 0:0215 0:9785
37775
N =
h
0:4922 0:4475 0:064
i
I calibrate the discount factor  and the transaction cost  to obtain the same
capital-output ratio and the same money-output ratio as in the benchmark economy.
This produces
  
2 0.981 0.2
The Gini coe¢ cients are as follows.
Gini Index of
Income Money Wealth
0:61 0:65 0:7
As before, we have the correct ranking of the Gini coe¢ cients, and a high Gini
coe¢ cient for money. In this specication, however, consumption appears to be too
dispersed, with a Gini coe¢ cient of 0:52, which is greater than the value found in US
data (Krueger and Perri, 2005). Nevertheless, the fact that the money distribution
is much more dispersed than consumption and income is a robust outcome of the
formalization of money demand in this paper.
29
8 Conclusion
This paper uses a remarkable fact about household money holdings to discuss the
relevance of various theories of money demand: the distribution of money across
households is similar to the distribution of nancial assets, and very di¤erent from
the distribution of consumption. The theories which provide a foundation of money
demand with frictions in the goods market cannot reproduce this fact with realistic
assumptions, and yield a distribution of money similar to that of consumption.
This paper provides a model where a simple transaction cost in nancial markets
generates a realistic joint distribution of money and nancial assets. Due to this
cost, the average expected return to money can be higher than that on nancial
assets without any other frictions. Of course, this paper does not claim that the
existence of a cash-in-advance constraint for a range of goods is unimportant for
some aspects of money demand, for example for currency holdings. But it does
seem that a nancial approach to money demand is more relevant when we consider
broader money aggregates. The analysis of the real and welfare e¤ects of various
types of shocks in this framework is a useful avenue for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium Values
The following table provides the equilibrium values of the model.
K M Y C L r w
15:7992 0:4231 1:2944 0:6694 0:3169 0:0087 1:9108
A.2 Computational Strategy
The computational strategy for the stationary equilibrium of the type of model used
in this paper is now well-dened. The stationary value functions are solved by itera-
tion over the value function. For a given real interest rate r and a xed ination rate,
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the other six value functions fV parj (:; :; e1) ; V parj (:; :; e2) ; V parj (:; :; e3) ; V exj (:; :; e1) ;
V ext (:; :; e
2) ; V ext (:; :; e
3)g are iterated using standard techniques. The value func-
tion iteration avoids any assumptions regarding the di¤erentiability of the value
function, which is not guaranteed here. After convergence, I determine the station-
ary distribution to compute aggregate nancial savings and the total real quantity of
money. I then adjust the real interest rate until the market for the riskless nancial
assets clears. Note that no equilibrium condition is necessary for the real quantity
of money, as the ratio of the nominal to the real quantity of money endogenously
determines the equilibrium money price of the nal good.
To speed up convergence, I compute the level of the value function on a rst
grid where maxima are found by a hill-climbing algorithm. To obtain precise value
functions, I extrapolate this rst grid via a second grid. One important point is that
this must be a square grid (and not rectangular), so as not to favour an asset in
term of portfolio adjustment. The rst grid has 30 values for money and 700 values
for nancial assets. The second grid decomposes each increment into 50 separate
points for both money and nancial assets. Value maximization is thus carried out
for 35000 di¤erent values of the nancial asset and 1500 values for money.
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